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Abstract: This paper's primary purpose is to show that there is a 
peculiar alternative to scientism whose central thesis is not about 
sources of knowledge or the existence of various objects, but it aims 
at setting out a strategy to help decide which of the two mutually 
exclusive beliefs is the better one to adopt. Scientophilia, to coin a 
term, recommends preferring, without any discussion, a position con-
sistent with the consensus of credible and reliable experts in a given 
domain. In case there is no such agreement, mainly because peers 
disagree with each other, or experts are difficult to identify, it is rec-
ommended for a scientophile to suspend judgment. Scientophilia is 
not a position on science or human knowledge boundaries, but it deals 
with the practical side of belief change. Verdicts made by this ap-
proach are partially similar to those offered by mild scientism, as 
scientophilia puts scientific knowledge as one of the most reliable 
sources. However, it is also consistent with mild antiscientism, as in 
some particular cases (for example, Moorean truths), it assigns relia-
ble expertise to non-scientific experts. Therefore it is a third way. 
Keywords: Antiscientism; demarcation of science; scientism; sciento-
philia.  
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1. What science is? 
 Before anything is said about scientism and scientophilia, it is first nec-
essary to discuss the very concept of science. The question "what is science?" 
is similar to the Augustinian question about what time is. Until we make 
an effort to find an answer, the issue seems to be simple. However, once we 
try to take on this seemingly trivial challenge, we notice that we are dealing 
with an extraordinarily complicated and multidimensional human activity, 
one which is continuously evolving and changing. The term "science" has 
very positive connotations and suggests that we are dealing with the highest 
quality of knowledge. This word is so well-established in our language that, 
as Susan Haack notes, it often has an ennobling function (Haack, 2012). 
The prestige that goes hand in hand with this term is undoubtedly related 
to the natural sciences' success. The aura of reliability surrounding the word 
"science" gives rise to a strong temptation to use it for persuasion. We ob-
serve such attempts every day. Advertisements cite scientific research, the 
results of which assure us of the positive characteristics of the product of-
fered to us. Participants in television debates willingly use the authority of 
science to authenticate their position in a dispute. Even university circles 
are not immune: various disciplines and fields of study containing the word 
"science" in their names, such as cognitive science, political science, social 
science, are proliferating at universities around the world (Haack, 2012). 
The variety of contexts in which the term "science" occurs raises the ques-
tion of its exact definition. 
 Unfortunately, the very concept of science is vague (Hansson, 2013); 
therefore, it cannot be precisely defined. Nonetheless, the term "science" can 
be applied in the vast majority of cases, albeit the existence of a grey area, 
in which the use of this term will be ambiguous, is inevitable. No one will 
argue with the claim that tying shoes, playing tennis, or watching a film at 
the cinema are not examples of doing science. Similarly, no one will deny 
that in the Michelson–Morley experiment or the Hershey–Chase experi-
ment, we are dealing with science par excellence. It does not mean that a 
scientific approach to tying shoes, playing tennis, or watching a film is im-
possible; one could not be more wrong, though in most cases, tying shoes is 
nothing other than tying shoes. 
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 On the other hand, one can discuss whether a Michelson–Morley exper-
iment finalized during a theatrical performance is scientific or not. Such 
discussions only begin when a particular issue is located in the grey area. 
As if that was not enough, not only do we not know where science begins 
and where it ends, but we do not know precisely when it was created. Was 
Aristotle’s inquiry about the natural world a science or not yet? Did Ptol-
emy conduct science? Is Ibn al-Haytham’s Optics a scientific work? Follow-
ing Massimo Pigliucci (2017), it could be argued that they are in a sense, 
but certainly not in the way we talk about biology, astronomy, or optics 
today. As Robin Dunbar (1996) notes, it can be said that the traditional 
Japanese method of ayu fishing also has something scientific about it, as its 
effectiveness was because fishers managed to correctly recognize the mating 
habits of this species. This example does not mean that centuries ago in 
Japan, fishers practiced ethology in the same way it is practiced at modern 
universities. 
 Contrary to common opinion, there is no single scientific method; there-
fore, science's diversity is also manifested in its methodologies (Haack, 2016; 
van Woudenberg, 2011). Not all sciences are experimental, and not all sci-
ences predict phenomena and explain them. The same holds true for using 
statistical methods, creating computer models, or using surveys. The rea-
sons for this state of affairs can vary. Some scientific disciplines do not need 
specific tools, e.g., physicists will never use a survey in their work. Some 
fields cannot use specific research methods for various reasons, or they are 
applicable in only a minimal range; for example, in disciplines such as psy-
chology or medicine, it is not always possible to use experimental methods 
due to ethical issues.  
 For these reasons, it cannot be said that there is such a thing as one 
science. There is a whole cosmos of sciences similar in some respects and 
different in others (Haack, 2016). Whenever we talk about science, we as-
sume a definition that involves arbitrary decisions and includes disciplines 
that someone else would not include among the sciences. This does not 
mean that one can use the term "science" freely and, for example, put magic 
on a par with astronomy, as Feyerabend (1993) did in his "Against method". 
Similarly, as there is no one science, there cannot be one nonscience. It is 
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worth noting that the term "nonscience" applies to a relatively broad con-
cept, which includes not only tying shoes, swimming, dancing, or watching 
movies, but also religion, practical knowledge, political beliefs, poetry, and 
a vast range of so-called pseudoscientific theories such as astrology, crea-
tionism, homeopathy, Lysenkoism, or phrenology. Every pseudoscientific 
theory should be classified as a nonscience, but not the other way around. 
A pseudoscientific claim is not only nonscientific but, contrary to other 
nonscientific activities, its proponent aims to create the impression that we 
are facing the most reliable knowledge in this particular subject matter, 
which is not the case. It follows that drawing a demarcation line between 
science and nonscience is more complicated than it might seem because the 
world of nonscience is internally diverse. That is why there are still fierce 
arguments about where the demarcation line separating science from non-
science should be placed (Hansson, 2013; Nickles, 2013; Pigliucci, 2013; 
Simonton, 2018). 
2. Nonscience and pseudoscience 
 The problem of demarcating science from pseudoscience attracted phi-
losophers of science's attention in particular and is often taken as equivalent 
to the more general term "demarcation of science." However, this issue is 
vital; not every demarcation line will be established to distinguish between 
science and pseudoscience, as it is essential to differentiate among other 
above-mentioned nonscientific activities. Indeed, one issue related to the 
distinction between science and pseudoscience can be generalized to the 
whole question of demarcation. As Hansson (2013) put it, "For a scientist 
distinguishing between science and pseudoscience is much like riding a bi-
cycle" even though there is no explicit criterium of demarcation, that is to 
say, it is instead a matter of tacit knowledge. In most cases, most scientists 
will unanimously recognize scientific inquiries, just as most people will rec-
ognize a short man. 
 Moreover, just as it will be hard for us to pinpoint when a person ceases 
to be short, it will be hard for scientists to pinpoint the moment when a 
human activity begins or ceases to be science. This quandary also applies 
to both nonscience and pseudoscience. It is not the job of a layman to 
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distinguish science from nonscience, but it is a proper task for an expert in 
the field. There is no better candidate even if such an expert cannot estab-
lish a sharp boundary between them. 
 Nonetheless, it is crucial to distinguish between the broad and narrow 
meaning of the "science" term. The latter originated in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and its meaning was restrained to the very study of nature. Science 
in a broad sense is a quest for seeking knowledge about the laws of nature 
and an attempt to discover, explain, and understand the mechanisms regu-
lating and influencing our organisms' functioning, psyche, or the regularities 
governing social life. There is no reason why we should exclude psychology, 
sociology, economy, or history from the set of science in the aforementioned 
broad sense. These are also remarkable, methodically conducted, and aca-
demically acclaimed inquiries, and what is even more relevant, social sci-
ences strive to produce the most epistemically warranted knowledge there 
is. If we consider epistemological success and reliability, then there is a 
meaningful discrepancy between natural sciences and social science, and the 
advantage of the former over the latter is indisputable. The credibility of 
the evidence and the verifiability of theses provided by climate science is 
incomparably more significant than those present in historical sciences. 
However, since historians have established the exact course of the events of 
the Holocaust, there is no reason to dismiss their claims merely because 
history is a less credible science than climate physics, especially since there 
are no other reliable studies on past events than those conducted by aca-
demic historians. 
 To sum it up, it is impossible to indicate the boundaries of the term 
“science”, which means that it is impossible to indicate exactly where it 
begins or where it ends; it is also problematic to distinguish its elements 
(Blackford, 2017), and it will also be dubious about differentiating between 
science and nonscience and science and pseudoscience conspicuously. This 
does not mean that everything can be contained in this term, but that the 
powerful feature, namely scientificity, is a gradable property and can some-
times be overlooked or mistakenly attributed to an object. In the broad 
sense, adopted here, science is a conglomerate of many disciplines that in-
tersect and mix. Indeed, science is not the only source of knowledge, but it 
is a recognized source (de Ridder, 2018). This recognition is based on the 
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power of authority that we assign to science, which in practice is equivalent 
to accepting scientific assertions. Not every scientific discipline stands out 
to the same extent as physics or the natural sciences in general, so not every 
science should be treated as an authority with the same clout as the natural 
sciences, and if any specific issue turns out to be a nonscientific one, it does 
not mean it is worthless. In some disciplines, especially in the social sciences, 
experts' opinions will be only slightly better than that of laypeople. 
3. Science from a social epistemology perspective 
 If we look at science from an epistemological perspective, it is hard to 
deny that scientific theorems deserve proper respect because of the sciences 
considerable cognitive success. It does not mean that they should be treated 
as absolute truths and scientists as their infallible preachers (Haack, 2007). 
Nothing could be more wrong: scientific knowledge is fallible, uncertain, and 
far from perfect, like any other human creation. It is not the degree of 
certainty of scientific statements that deserves esteem, but the way scien-
tists have succeeded in developing our ordinary ways of thinking.  
 Scientists engage in such activities as experiments, take measurements, 
collect data, analyze them, draw conclusions from them, publish in peer-
review journals, compare their results, replicate their colleagues' studies 
looking for errors in them (Goldman, 1999). To this end, researchers are 
developing various standardized procedures that facilitate their evaluation. 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to work out one universal recipe 
that would allow us to assess, always and everywhere, what evidence is 
needed to resolve a given dispute. Humanity is continuously improving old 
methods or developing new methods, and this work better in a given context 
but do worse in others. Some specific standards are common to many dis-
ciplines; others can be found only in mathematics, physics, yet others in 
psychology. Some disciplines have stringent and precise rules of evidence — 
here, the model is mainly formal sciences. In others, a lot still depends on 
the researchers and their decisions, as in the social sciences. Some pieces of 
evidence are so complicated that professionals need years to detect errors 
in them. Even in the case of mathematics, it can take years to detect an 
error in a proof. It took 11 years to find a fault in one of the famous four-
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color theorem's alleged proofs. It took decades to establish the consensus 
which is currently adopted on the observed climate change. As early as 
1991, 67% of the scientifically active climatologists were convinced that it 
is a human activity that is causing the planet to overheat; it was only in 
2009 that this percentage approached 100% (it was about 97%) (Cook et 
al., 2016). Unfortunately, expert opinions are not always unanimous; there 
is much discussion in science, controversial views, unsolved problems. That 
is because the research and data collected do not always allow for an une-
quivocal adoption of a given conclusion. As if that was not enough, it is not 
uncommon for scientists to make mistakes or even to commit ordinary for-
gery (Fanelli, 2009). Additionally, there are phenomena such as merchants 
of doubt i.e., scientists paid by various interest groups who question the 
research results unfavorable to the client (e.g., the harmfulness of tobacco 
or the ecological effects of burning fossil fuels) (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). 
Science defends itself against such problems quite a simple way: the scien-
tific community is continuously keeping an eye on itself. It is possible thanks 
to various protective mechanisms, such as the blind review method of pub-
lications, replication studies, discussions, meta-analyses, new measurement 
methods, and tools. The foundation for these safeguards is the constant 
pursuit of processes, let us call them knowledge-making processes, which 
are as transparent and replicable as possible. Adaptation of these proce-
dures means that in an ideal situation, every competent researcher should 
replicate, step by step, an experiment conducted by a colleague or replicate 
a measurement, thus checking whether the same result can be obtained. 
Various sciences manage to implement this idea to varying degrees, which 
does not change the fact that the pursuit of intersubjective communication 
is the common denominator of all kinds of scientific thinking. The safe-
guarding system, which results from implementing the idea of intersubjec-
tivity to varying degrees, is far from perfect and is unable to stop us from 
finding errors and mistakes in science. In this case, the only thing we can 
hope for is to reduce their number. 
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4. Experts and nonexperts 
 The word "expert" has a broad meaning, as we commonly refer to people 
who have acquired an exceptional level of some skill or ability. In this sense, 
an expert is both a chess player, car mechanic, ballerina, and volleyball 
player. However, for epistemological purposes, one's expertise is narrowed 
down to a cognitive extent; therefore expert is a person who not only pos-
sesses a substantial body of truths in a given domain but also she is suffi-
ciently competent to form the right answers to new questions in her domain 
(Goldman, 2011).  
 Everyone would be a cognitive expert in an ideal world, and everyone 
could assess the quality of evidence behind two contradictory claims. Un-
fortunately, we do not live in such a reality; we have to deal with the fact 
that everyone is a layperson in our world. Even if someone is a nuclear 
physics professor, they are most likely a layperson in any other discipline 
such as crowd sociology, cognitive psychology, evolution theory, horse rid-
ing, chess gambits, fuzzy logic, mating habits of orangutans or ancient Ro-
man law. It does not mean that we are all ignorant, but that even the 
greatest erudite will have achieved mastery of a few disciplines at most. 
Nobody will ever know all spheres of science, literature, music, sport, his-
tory, or philosophy. In other words, there is a significant division of labor 
in science (D’Agostino, 2016).  
 Specialization requires time and sacrifice, mostly when we talk about 
the natural sciences. They are characterized by such a high degree of com-
plexity that a layperson would not understand even an abstract of a paper 
without proper training. The development of scientific disciplines and the 
following specialization have gone so far that the evaluation of evidence 
collected by experts is beyond a dilettante's capabilities or even for a single 
expert. In the last century, Derek de Solla Price observed a rapidly growing 
multi-author publication trend in science (Price, 1963). Nowadays, this ten-
dency is even more visible, as the "Multi-authorship and research analytics" 
report claims, the most frequent number of authors is three, and the count 
of papers with at least 100 involved scientists is continuously growing 
(Adams et al., 2019). These scientists often represent different disciplines, 
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which means that a single expert cannot even review interdisciplinary teams 
publications because his expertise is too narrow. 
 Besides our lack of competence, there is another reason we are doomed 
to scientists, which is that we have too little time. The continual increase 
in knowledge, measured by the number of scientific publications, is too vast 
for one person to be able to take all of it in. In 2012, the number of annual 
publications exceeded 1.8 million (Ware and Mabe, 2012). It may be com-
forting to know that there are also such issues whose complexity level is so 
low that we cannot say there are laypeople in their case. Each of us is an 
expert in matters such as our pocket contents, our parents' names, or our 
place of residence; we know perfectly well whether we have a toothache or 
not. When someone asks us if we have a lighter or wants to know what time 
it is, we will not consult an expert because we can answer these questions 
immediately or know how to answer ourselves. In other words, in the face 
of such issues, we can trust ourselves. Unfortunately, we will not always 
have such comfort.  
 A person who thinks that she can decide whether human activity is the 
cause of the climate catastrophe, whether vaccines cause autism, whether 
GMO is harmful, or whether 5G technology harms the human brain is under 
an illusion. Our autonomy in such complicated matters boils down to merely 
recognizing some sources of information we have found credible and reject-
ing others as unreliable. There is always a third way, i.e., to suspend judg-
ment. Unfortunately, such a skeptical attitude cannot save us from all di-
lemmas, because in some cases, the suspension of judgment is tantamount 
to taking action consistent with one of the disputed positions. A layperson 
may recognize that the dispute over climate change's genesis is overwhelm-
ing and thus refrain from taking a position. Unfortunately, the dispute over 
climate change also applies to human actions because one side recommends 
reducing CO2 emissions, and the other claims that such actions are unnec-
essary. Depending on whether a layperson will try to reduce their impact 
on the environment or not, they will act as recommended by one or the 
other party to the dispute. At least in some cases, we will not escape having 
to decide on whom to believe. That is why it is worth finding a strategy 
that gives one the least chance of making a mistake. The choice of such 
tactics is essential in the modern world of information overload. On the 
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internet, one can find everything from scientific research, through reports 
about mermaids living in the Atlantic Ocean, to video recordings of alleged 
time travelers. The conclusion is as follows: we are laymen; hence the de-
pendence on an expert's testimony is inevitable (Goldberg, 2016; Lackey, 
2011); if so, our ability to assess the degree of expertise of others and their 
credibility is a crucial skill. 
5. Informed trust in expert opinion 
 Regardless of whether we are talking about the natural or social sciences, 
scientific knowledge is the product of a complex structure built by large 
teams of people, and a layman's confidence in scientific claims can only be 
based on trust in these structures. However, contrary to John Hardwig 
(1991), trust in science does not have to be blind; more so, it could be, as 
Naomi Oreskes (2019) calls it, informed trust. Jennifer Lackey (2011), one 
of the so-called social epistemologist, notes that everything we know is more 
or less based on other people's testimony; undeniably, we are told such 
things as how everything around us works, what is going on in foreign coun-
tries, where our food came from, what is it made of, what happened before 
our birth. It is hard to pinpoint any specific part of our knowledge that we 
established without trusting in someone else testimony. It is precisely the 
same case with scientific discoveries. Problems start to emerge when we face 
many contradictory statements that express these testimonies, which is, 
unfortunately, an inevitable situation with scientific knowledge.  
 Social epistemology is an expanding philosophical discipline that offers 
some guidance in this baffling situation. Unlike plain epistemology, this very 
discipline is concerned not with abstract and theoretical issues but mainly 
with such practical problems as testimony, judgment aggregation, and peer 
disagreement. It is worth pinpointing that the following heuristic's primary 
purpose is to make our decision process about trusting in expert testimony 
more efficient. It is not designed to advise on such issues as establishing 
scientific truth, and its character is probabilistic, which means if a layperson 
follows these cues, she will increase the odds that she chose a reliable opin-
ion.  
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Scientific experts differ from laypeople in several significant respects, in-
cluding their extensive and substantive knowledge in a given field, and that 
they gravitate towards using this knowledge to answer new questions and 
solve current problems in their field, evaluate evidence gathered by their 
peers (Goldman, 2011). It is reasonable to treat an expert's opinion in their 
field of expertise as more reliable than that of a layperson because expertise 
in a particular field carries with it a specific type of authority, namely, 
cognitive authority. Of course, relying on such authority is fallible under 
the fallible nature of scientific inquiry itself, but the layperson has nothing 
better up their sleeve, as it was concluded earlier. 
 There is no distinct point beyond which the layperson becomes an ex-
pert. Expertise is a continuous trait in which sheer ignorance lies on one 
side of the spectrum and extraordinary competence on the opposite. There 
is a consistent pattern, layperson or even a novice exploring a given domain 
of scientific knowledge lacks, at least partially, access to the evidence that 
the expert has, is unable to correctly assess the soundness of the reasoning 
on which the expert bases his conclusion, and does not have access to studies 
critical to the expert's position (Goldman, 2011; Hardwig, 1985, 1991). 
Nonetheless, nonexpert might have reasons for believing that the opinion of 
a given expert is sound, and even might have reasons to believe that this 
particular expert is more reliable than her opponent (Goldman, 2011). In 
the latter case, Alvin Goldman (2011) posits that layperson makes an in-
ference about levels of expertise of rival experts. Albeit, I would argue that 
informed trust in an expert's opinion, in general, can be called inferring to 
the best expertise, on the grounds that it necessarily includes the stage of 
comparing a given opinion with the position of other experts. 
6. Expert’s credibility and reliability 
 The question of trust in expert opinion can be whittled down to two 
separate but related issues. The first is the problem of establishing an ex-
pert's credibility, and the second is connected with an attempt to enact a 
level of reliability of his opinion. Whenever we meet with the opinion of a 
putative expert, regardless of whether it is a public debate, any discussion, 
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or even in a private conversation, our first step should be to establish the 
given expert's credibility. 
 To achieve this goal, we should first establish whether the author of the 
opinion is an expert in the relevant field. There is the crucial distinction 
between a reputational expert, that is, a person who is perceived as one, 
and an actual specialist; when the former role is discretionary and may be 
filled by anyone, even a celebrity, the latter is based on objective premises 
(Goldman, 2011). Expertise in an irrelevant field can create such a reputa-
tional expert too. As I mentioned before, the range of every expertise is 
invariably limited to the specific domain, and an expert's opinion that ex-
ceeds their area of interest is not much better than that of a layperson. 
Unfortunately, we tend to effortlessly ascribe authority to someone when 
they should not have any, so being aware of the limitations of expertise is 
invaluable. Far-reaching specialization means that it is no longer enough to 
be a physicist to talk about climate change causes; a more narrow speciali-
zation is needed, which in this case is climatology. Climate science is an 
exceedingly complicated field; only a dedicated specialist can be up to date 
with the latest research and findings.  
 Taking the above into account, relying on the opinion of an expert whose 
area of specialization is adjacent to the proper one may be deceptive or even 
lead us astray. Undoubtedly, among particle physicists, we will find many 
familiar with climate science, but their knowledge will always be simplified 
and limited compared to that of an experienced climatologist. At the same 
time, we encounter many climate deniers among physicists. It is true in any 
other discipline; some philosophers, historians, psychologists, sociologists, 
and even laypeople will be more or less informed, and some will be unques-
tionably ignorant. However, none of them can match the knowledge of ex-
perts in climate science.  Therefore the first cue is as follows: if an opinion 
O is within a subject domain S, expertise of a person E who asserts that O 
is true (false) should be in S too (Walton et al., 2008; Walton, 1996). 
 Determining the pertinence of a range of expertise is essential; however, 
establishing an expert's credibility is not a sufficient condition. There are 
other cues, which can be supportive in this task. Each expert can boast a 
history of opinions given, based on which their credibility can be deter-
mined; it often involves such issues as absence or presence of frauds, conflict 
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of interest or documented attempts of concealments of such conflicts, pla-
giarism (Goldman, 2011). It is worth pointing out that not every industry-
funded scientist is undeserving of our trust; it depends on the whole social 
context of their activity, mainly is their opinion is a product of the scientific 
community, namely, did they attend a conference and publish their paper 
in a peer-reviewed journal. If this is the case, then we are free to assume 
that all critical norms and scientific scrutiny are satisfied, and their contri-
bution to the field is as good as any other (Oreskes, 2019). There is a reason 
why a given expert's social background is among crucial cues of their cred-
ibility. The quality of research that cannot be found anywhere else is pre-
cisely the product of various procedures regulating scientists' work. This 
epistemic quality of research, which cannot be found anywhere else, is the 
result of the various procedures which formulate the work of scientists. Such 
quality can only be achieved within a community that meets certain condi-
tions, such as considering and testing many alternative hypotheses, allowing 
multiple competing points of view, self-criticism, an evidence-based ap-
proach to eliminating hypotheses, replication, and modification of con-
ducted research. For example, Fred Singer, a prominent rocket scientist, 
has been involved in many initiatives sponsored by the tobacco industry, 
the purpose of which was to cast a shadow of doubt on the scientific evi-
dence linking smoking with lung cancer (Oreskes and Conway, 2010); fur-
thermore, his claims have not been published in any peer-reviewed journal.  
 On this basis, distrust of Singer's opinion on the causes of climate change 
is reasonable. His expertise is not pertinent; other experts do not review his 
views and do not review his view since the so-called merchant of doubt 
considerably undermines his authority and credibility. Being a merchant of 
doubt does not ensure that Singer's opinions are dubious (however, it sig-
nificantly reduces their importance); there is still a chance that his opinion 
expresses a scientific consensus on climate change. To rule this out, one 
must compare his words with other researchers’ positions and decide if it is 
consistent with what other expert assert. The risk that we are dealing with 
a view designed only to spread disinformation is insignificant, on the basis 
that the greater the expert's agreement on X, the greater the likelihood that 
the evidence available to humanity supports this particular view. In this 
particular situation, consistency with other experts' opinions outweighs the 
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unreliable source of information. Even a broken clock is right twice a day, 
but it is reasonable to trust it only if it is consistent with other clocks. 
Suppose a given expert opinion is inconsistent or even contradicts the sci-
entific consensus. In that case, it is safer to reject such a view on the basis 
that the likelihood of the situation where the majority of experts have gone 
awry and we have met a prodigy presenting a groundbreaking discovery is 
much lower than the likehood that experts are correct, and alleged prodigy 
is a fraud. To simplify, let us assume that expert’s position in discipline X 
is true in 51 cases out of 100. That is enough reason for a layperson to 
prefer the expert community's coherent view over their guessing, other non-
expert opinions, or the opinion of a dubious and lonesome scientist. One 
may ask why one should ever worry about expert credibility when consensus 
is much more critical. This issue is crucial as a credible expert is often an 
excellent source to inquire about whether there is a consensus; it is also 
much easier to establish the credibility of one expert and focus on the con-
sensus question afterward than to check the entire community's position in 
the first place. 
 Unquestionably, trusting in science is always risky; after all, sometimes 
science makes mistakes, and the position of science is not developed once 
and for all. New evidence may force it to change and, consequently, the 
layperson's opinion should be updated. In other words, the dilettante's opin-
ion on issues examined by science should be, "science's position is my posi-
tion," not because science is the only reliable source of knowledge, but be-
cause — as Bertrand Russell notes — when the experts agree on something, 
the opposite view cannot be regarded as certain (Russell, 2004). Above 
thought can be expressed by paraphrasing Alvin Plantinga's maxim: "When 
any belief and science clash, 'tis belief must go to smash" (Plantiga, 2018, 
226).1 This slogan can be developed as follows: "Where it conflicts with 
common sense, religion, and tradition, science should be regarded as au-
thoritative for education and public policy as well as objective inquiry; and 
scientific knowledge is even relevant to moral and political deliberation" 
(Ladyman, 2018, 106). What if science clashes with another science. 
 
1  In his article, Alvin Plantinga focuses on the conflict between scientism and 
religion; hence the maxim he quoted was, "When faith and science clash, 'tis faith 
must go to smash." I have taken the liberty of generalizing it to all beliefs. 
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7. Disagreement among peers 
 The proposed heuristics offer some guidance when there are two or even 
more experts with rival opinions. Whenever we face contradictory testimo-
nies of experts within a pertinent domain of expertise and whose history is 
untainted by suspicious activity, our last resort is the very question about 
scientific consensus and its relation to these testimonies. Our trust should 
be given proportionally to the support of the opinion given by the commu-
nity of experts, or as some social epistemologists call this approach, we 
should "use the numbers" (Coady, 2006; Goldman, 2011).  
 Consider the dispute over X; scientists have proposed three solutions: 
A, B and C. Each group supports their position with some scientific evi-
dence, such as completed experiments, the proper amount of measurements, 
or other analyzed data types. However, experts disagree on quality of those, 
and as a result, 40% support solution A, 33% support B and 27% think that 
C is the best answer. The layperson is universally unable to judge the whole 
body of evidence behind any of these options, but can judge the experts' 
credibility. All groups consist of professionals with a similar level of trust-
worthiness, there is nothing suspicious in their previous activities, they have 
published the whole body of evidence in peer-review journals. There is noth-
ing else for a layperson to do but to assign these positions no more signifi-
cant degree of belief than professionals' amount of support. The conclusion 
is that none of the proposals put forward by scientists can be considered as 
the science position.  
 There is no single answer to what percentage of a given scientific com-
munity must agree to describe theirs as the position of science and treat it 
as a reliable stance on some issue. It all depends on the particular issue and 
the context in which it is being considered. When we wonder whether to 
use a homeopathic remedy, we only need the qualitative information that 
the vast majority of medical specialists consider such therapies ineffective. 
For a politician who must decide whether to regulate the legality of such 
treatments in the state, information about the "vast majority" will not be 
enough. Determining whether 61% or 91% is behind the term "vast major-
ity" is of great importance in this case. However, knowing that there is no 
"vast majority" or there is no majority among experts at all will be always 
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compelling, and should be treated as a serious reason not to prefer any of 
the positions.  
 If asked today, no one will have a problem with answering whether the 
iguanodon was a bipedal animal, because the position of paleontology in 
this matter is unambiguous. It was different in the first half of the 19th 
century, when paleontology was a fledgling discipline, and the incomplete 
reptile skeleton had just been discovered. Two paleontology pioneers argued 
about the dinosaur's posture. The first, Sir Richard Owen, considered the 
animal to have been four-legged, and the second, Gideon Mantell, two-leg-
ged. The lack of a complete skeleton allowed some freedom in how to re-
construct the shape of the dinosaur. It was not until discovering other fossils 
that this dispute was resolved in favor of Mantell's position. Until then, a 
layperson could do nothing but suspend their judgement, on account of the 
lack of agreement between experts. 
 There are possible scenarios where the problem under consideration is 
within a domain where experts are difficult to identify, or the given field is 
so straightforward that no expert opinion is required. There are a plethora 
of different fields in which the existence of cognitive experts is at least 
questionable. There are undoubtedly authorities in such domains, although 
not every authority, however influential, is based on cognitive expertise. An 
example of the fields I am referring to may be most areas of the humanities, 
theological considerations, or even religions. There will undoubtedly be 
some expertise in these areas related to their history or doctrine content. 
The existence of such established consensus is not under contention here, 
although it is crucial to make a distinction between agreement on what 
Plato's, Aristotle's, or Kant's concept of metaphysics was about and agree-
ment on the fundamental nature of reality itself. The former is a matter for 
the history of philosophy; the latter is a genuine metaphysical issue. As far 
as the history of philosophy is concerned, there are reliable experts within 
this domain, just as there are reliable experts in physics's history. It is worth 
to emphasize that from the perspective presented here, it is of paramount 
importance whether there is a consensus on a given issue or not; accord-
ingly, the discussion about the existence of experts can be relegated to the 
background as an attempt to establish whether there is a consensus or not 
plays a decisive role. Therefore, a question about metaphysics should be 
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stated as follows: is there any metaphysical issue for which most experts 
have established a solution? The answer to this question is negative. Not a 
single problem has been solved in terms of which most metaphysicians 
agree. Plato's metaphysical system competes with Aristotle's system and 
every other set of metaphysical beliefs. Therefore, as in the Mantell vs. 
Owen case, layperson could do nothing but suspend their judgement about 
metaphysical issues. 
 Similarly, not only is Islam a holistic alternative to Christianity, but so 
is any other religion. Textbooks in various fields of science are a good illus-
tration of this point. Books explaining the principles of thermodynamics or 
the theory of evolution refer to the current state of human knowledge while 
at the same time, they inform about issues on which there is consensus 
between experts in a given discipline. Such texts involve many simplifica-
tions, which does not change the fact that they contain a set of findings, 
i.e., statements considered true. There are no textbooks of metaphysics that 
contain or present the current state of knowledge about the nature of reality 
because there is not even the slightest consensus on this matter. There is 
no question of textbooks in the case of religion because there are holy books 
that are expositions of a specific faith, and there are religious studies that 
describe various doctrines. The reason for this difference is that the sciences 
have established certain things. The position of science regarding the num-
ber of planets in the solar system is unambiguous. Thanks to the work of 
astronomers, we know that there are eight of them. There is neither a phil-
osophical nor religious position on the number of existing gods; it is impos-
sible to designate even the smallest number of deities common to all known 
faiths. Each philosophical and religious system proposes a pantheon that is 
unique to it, filled with a different number of various gods. Even if some 
religions postulate one god's existence, they attribute different properties to 
it and suggest different methods of communicating with it, thus explicitly 
excluding any similarity between them. In such a case, the extension of the 
term "expert" to include the authors of metaphysical concepts, founders of 
religions, theologians are acceptable under the assumption that expertise is 
gradable. Such disciplines as metaphysics, epistemology, or theology can be 
treated as fields in the pre-paradigmatic phase, to use Thomas Kuhn's term, 
as these areas are always torn by disputes over fundamental issues none of 
18  Szymon Makuła 
Organon F 2021: 1–38 
them has an established consensus. Therefore, experts in these fields are 
experts whose reliability is limited. However, this is a consequence of the 
application of a general heuristic: if a particular field is lacking even the 
slightest consensus, then before someone decides to trust one of the concepts 
presented in those domains, they should indicate why we ought to prefer 
this and not another position. Otherwise, acceptance of any particular po-
sition in the unresolved dispute gives rise to the risk of making an error, 
proportional to the aggregate percentage of support for other viewpoints. It 
is irrelevant if this dispute is within physics, biology, gender studies, or 
philosophy. 
 Sooner or later, we will come across issues that will be difficult to be 
assigned unambiguously to a specific discipline. What kind of expertise is 
needed to evaluate a given political decision or the overall reform under-
taken by a government? Is the opinion of a political science specialist 
enough, or on the contrary, is a consultation with an economist needed, or 
is it both? Why not ask a sociologist too or a professor of law. Cases such 
as these are beyond the comprehension of a single domain; therefore, it is 
difficult to name the pertinent expertise. It is reasonable to seek advice from 
an expert within a field of expertise related to the problem under consider-
ation and check for any common ground between their opinions. For exam-
ple, when we encounter an immense number of negative reviews of a given 
political reform, even if these opinions differ in magnitude, their common 
aspect is their negative nature. In such a situation, rejecting any positive 
review is a way to reduce the risk of adopting an ill-founded view or even a 
thoroughly inadequate verdict. 
 Before everything else, there are matters of subjects where no cognitive 
expertise is needed, besides the opinion of an involved person or a group of 
engaged people. There is no justification for scientific approach to estab-
lishing how to hold a woodcutter's ax; moreover, any experts other than 
the woodcutter alone are unnecessary. To convene an expert committee to 
determine the contents of a given refrigerator or someone's pocket is also 
beside the point and even ludicrous. There is no community of experts ca-
pable of telling a father of five which of his children should he kiss first after 
supper. These are only a few examples, but there are a plethora of different 
issues, and even domains, where scientific expertise is redundant, and the 
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testimony, intuition, common knowledge, hunch or a guess of a single per-
son is a good source of opinion, and a fair basis for making a decision. 
8. Scientophilia 
 Inspired by the term Biophilia, the love of all living things coined by 
Edward Wilson (1984), I would like to propose a name for the heuristic 
presented above: scientophilia – the love of science. Love of science is mo-
tivated by the fact that science provides knowledge of the best possible 
degree of justification and manifests itself in an established consensus 
among credible experts. I would venture to put forward the thesis that most 
of us very often behave as a scientophile. 
 Until 1992, Pluto was considered a planet, but observations made at 
that time and in the following years enriched our knowledge with new in-
formation, which precluded us from calling this object a planet any longer. 
It turned out that Pluto has a smaller mass than the rest of the bodies co-
orbiting it, which is a breach of one of the necessary conditions for being a 
planet. In 2006, after several years of disputes, scientists developed the po-
sition that Pluto is a different type of celestial body than previously 
thought, namely a dwarf planet. The vast majority of us behaved in this 
matter like quintessential scientophiles—overnight, we stopped listing Pluto 
among the planets, thus rejecting the view that there are nine of them in 
the solar system. Insisting on the opposite position would have been unrea-
sonable in this situation. Currently, the whole world is struggling with the 
severe problem of the COVID-19 pandemic, and most of us, although un-
fortunately not all of us, try to follow the recommendations of scientists. 
We cannot independently check whether we are sick, predict how the virus 
will spread, determine what behaviors are safe or whether animals can infect 
us. We are condemned to expert opinions, and we trust them because those 
scientists work in organizations that guarantee their employees' reliability. 
 In conclusion, the main guideline of scientophilia can be described as 
inference to the most reliable and attainable expert's opinion. This heuristic 
name indicates a love of science because looking for scientific consensus is 
advantageous for establishing a well-informed opinion for a layperson inter-
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ested in a particular issue. In science, a consensus is not achieved by agree-
ment but by examining evidence supporting different positions. The scien-
tific community comprises groups of qualified experts using a variety of 
procedures to find the best explanations and theories to explain the evidence 
they collect. They are involved in such activities as critical discussions, 
gather, analyze, and evaluate various data and publish their research results 
in peer-reviewed journals. When the evidence starts to tip the balance to 
the side of some hypothesis acutely, consensus arises. Therefore, if such a 
community of cognitive experts has established a consensus on a particular 
issue, there is no better cue for a layperson to believe that the subject of a 
consensus is the most reliable position in that matter. Indeed, a consensus 
is not always essential, as it is frequently redundant and even impossible to 
achieve in various subject matters. However, if there is an established con-
sensus in a particular field in which we are interested, adopting an opinion 
contrary to the position of science is associated with a high risk of adopting 
a view that turns out to be false, and sometimes even harmful to our health 
or finances.  
 Scientophilia has some inconvenient consequences, as it entails a change 
of belief to reflect changes in science. Contrary to appearances, consensus-
based opinions are far from perfect and can change, as its foundation does. 
The view that there are eight planets in the solar system is applied because 
of the specific definition of the term "planet", based on the current infor-
mation about our planetary system, which, in turn, is influenced by the 
sensitivity of modern instruments used to observe space. Changing any of 
these elements will affect our knowledge of the solar system. A person fol-
lowing this heuristic in 1991 would have thought that it was quite likely 
that people were causing a sudden increase in temperatures, but there was 
no certainty, as there were a considerable group of credible experts who 
disagreed with the others. In 2019, however, things had changed, as there 
is almost 100% consensus on what causes climate change; therefore, some-
one would say that we have such certainty. If in 2034, climatologists agreed 
that they were wrong and it was not humans that caused the temperature 
rise, there would be no other choice but to accept the position of climate 
science. 
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9. What is scientism? 
 Scientism most often refers to a specific set of philosophical views on the 
relationship between science and other disciplines. As Rik Peels (2018, 29) 
observes, almost every type of scientism can be reduced to a set of state-
ments about “the relation that should obtain between the natural sciences 
on the one hand and something else—another academic discipline or an-
other realm of reality—on the other”. The above characteristic is also how 
scientism will be understood in this paper. As a side note, it should be noted 
that a scientist, by default, associates the term “science” either with physics 
alone or with the natural sciences, which is a relatively narrow meaning of 
the word. 
 One of the positions often associated with scientism is the view described 
by some authors as "scientific expansionism" (Stenmark, 2018) or "scientific 
imperialism" (Ladyman, 2018). According to this belief, the boundaries of 
science are far beyond what we think. Usually, this means that science can 
answer a much larger number of questions; in particular, it can answer 
questions that we have not associated with scientific research so far 
(Stenmark, 2018). The above remarks typically concern problems in the 
field of law, literature, and politics, as well as philosophy, in its broader 
meaning (Haack, 2012). Such scientism may vary in strength — its most 
extreme version refuses to acknowledge questions that science cannot an-
swer. When making claims about our knowledge's current state, scientific 
imperialism — in its extreme version — is trivially false, and we will prob-
ably not find a supporter of such a view. We know that there is a wide 
range of questions that none of the sciences can answer  , from those that 
each of us faces every day ("Should I drink coffee or tea?") to the more 
complicated ("What taxes should we introduce in our country?") (Haack, 
2012). It does not mean that scientific issues do not play any role in social 
matters. 
 On the contrary, its function is difficult to overestimate; e.g., medicine 
does not tell us whether vaccinations should be mandatory, whether the 
refusal of a vaccine should be punished, and if so how, but it does inform 
us about the benefits and disadvantages of vaccination so we can make 
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better decisions thanks to this knowledge. Assuming that scientific imperi-
alism does not make claims about the present state of science but about the 
future, there is no reason to reject or accept such a position. It is also 
unclear what would result from the adoption of such a view.  
 Let us assume that in the distant future, it will turn out that physics or 
the natural sciences will be able to indicate, from the set of all pressing 
questions, those that have been wrongly posed and answer the rest. Such a 
scenario in no way justifies the view that now philosophy, for example, 
should be done on the model of physics or that we should give it up com-
pletely. Instead, we should press on physicists to speed up their work. We 
can give up the humanities study only when physics replaces it, not when 
we think that it is possible. The extreme version of scientific imperialism 
may appear in a weaker, i.e., local, version. Such a version would occur if 
someone found that natural science has absorbed a set of issues specific to 
discipline X. An example of such a position may be the view that meta-
physical issues are currently being investigated by cosmologists, making 
philosophers’ attempts to resolve these problems superfluous. Local imperi-
alism is the most challenging position to assess because it collects various 
concepts, each of which deserves a separate analysis. Weak versions of sci-
entific imperialism do not seem to be particularly controversial. No one will 
deny that many scientific disciplines have emerged from philosophy, so at 
least some philosophical questions have been answered scientifically after 
undergoing appropriate modifications. It is even more difficult to reject the 
above view when we use the term “science” in the broad sense proposed 
earlier. The weak version of scientific imperialism, which says that science 
may or may not expand its borders in the future, expresses a belief in sci-
entific progress; hence an excellent rationale can be found.  
 The imperialist nature of scientism can be implemented in many ways. 
The first worthy of discussion is the reductionist version of scientism, or 
internal scientism, as Stenmark (2018) calls it. In proposing a specifically 
interpreted “scientization” of disciplines outside the natural sciences field, 
this view develops the idea behind scientific imperialism. Usually, the pro-
cess of scientization of a given discipline comes down to its complete reduc-
tion to a specific science in the strict sense, e.g., to physics, biology, or 
chemistry. An example of this is the famous sociobiology project of Edward 
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O. Wilson (1975). This type of scientization can be targeted at a specific 
discipline or all social sciences and humanities. Internal scientism is a dis-
tinctive position because it cannot be analyzed in isolation from a specific 
project of “scientization.” Such a discussion would require high competence 
in all areas involved in the proposed process, and as such, it goes far beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 The standpoint which Stenmark (2018) refers to as epistemic scientism 
can be regarded as different from the above understanding of scientism. 
According to Stenmark (2018), some scientists, philosophers, and thinkers 
(Rosenberg, 2011; Russell, 1978; Sellars, 1963) can be associated with the 
claim that "The only kind of genuine knowledge we can have is the one 
provided by the sciences" (Stenmark, 2018, 63), or even with the more ex-
treme position that "We are rationally entitled to believe only what is sci-
entifically justified" (Stenmark, 2018, 65). There are many possible varia-
tions of this notion, which means that its postulates can take different 
shapes, depending on their author (Boghossian, 2006; Kitcher, 2008; 
Rosenberg, 2011). For simplicity, I assume that their common denominator 
is one of the two theses cited by Stenmark. If both of these statements are 
treated literally, then finding countless counter-examples for them turns out 
to be a straightforward task. I know that I have two hands, I know that 
chess pawns attack only diagonally, I know that I have never been on the 
moon, I know that bachelors have no wives, I know that I have a mobile 
phone in my pocket, and I know all this without any help from the natural 
sciences. Any research methods and instruments used in natural sciences 
are unnecessary in determining the above facts. Nobody observes a bus stop 
in different weather conditions to determine the bus schedule; after all, it is 
enough to check the timetable. Examples of non-scientific knowledge, or 
Moorean truths, as Rene van Woudenberg (2011; 2018) calls them, can be 
multitudinous because the amount of knowledge sources other than science 
is staggering. Thus, when a scientist claims that the only source of 
knowledge about the world is physics/the natural sciences, they should ex-
plain their exclusion of the collection's Moorean truths. The easiest way to 
get out of this situation is for the scientist to admit to using a very narrow 
definition of knowledge that deals only with what scientistic knowledge is. 
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In such a situation, its exact content and its consequences should be con-
sidered. 
 What are the consequences of the fact that my knowledge of chess rules 
is not scientistic? Would the non-scientistic character of a police officer's 
knowledge of a suspect's guilt be a valid reason to abort the arrest? What 
about a lumberjack's knowledge of the correct way to hold an ax securely? 
Human knowledge, like science and scientism, is a vast and blurry concept. 
Nothing prevents one from cutting out some of its fragments and comparing 
their properties with others, which is advisable, if only for cognitive reasons. 
Moorean truths differ in some respects from the knowledge of engineers 
building solar sails for space vehicles, and these differ from the knowledge 
of logicians studying the relationships between various formal systems. To 
understand the rich world of human knowledge, it is undoubtedly necessary 
to distinguish its various manifestations. It does not change the fact that 
exclusive claim that only certain areas of human thought constitute 
knowledge requires precise clarification of non-knowledge fields. Depending 
on how one answers the question of the status of other alleged varieties of 
knowledge, epistemic scientism may turn out to be a false and absurd posi-
tion or not at all as controversial as it is usually painted. 
 Another variation on scientism worth mentioning is the ontological ver-
sion. Again following Stenmark, it can be said in simple terms that this 
type of scientism can be reduced to the thesis that “[t]he only things that 
exist are the ones that the sciences can discover” (Stenmark, 2018, 68), or 
in the words of Carl Sagan: “the Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever 
will be” (Sagan, 2013, 8). Scientism, which claims that the entire world is 
limited to physical entities, is close to some naturalism varieties. Ontologi-
cal scientism inherits from naturalism all the problems typical of this kind 
of position, i.e., problems with such issues as the existence of norms, works 
of art, laws of nature, or logical laws. Logically, this kind of scientism seems 
to be the strongest position since it entails all the other varieties mentioned 
above. Accepting that the world is limited to entities described by the nat-
ural sciences immediately imposes the adoption of the view that only the 
sciences provide knowledge of reality, the consequence of which is that all 
human forms of cognition should be either reduced to them or conducted 
like them. 
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 In summary, scientism, like science, is heterogeneous. The examples 
mentioned above of differences in understanding the concept of “scientism” 
do not exhaust the rich semantic field of this term. A particular case of 
scientism needs not to be limited to epistemological or ontological versions; 
the above varieties of scientism can often be combined, which is often the 
case. Most instances of extreme scientism, that is, one which claims that 
“science is the only...” are very easily dismissed as absurd or even merely 
false. It is different in the more moderate versions, which are much more 
challenging to evaluate without the theoretical context in which they occur. 
In particular, it is impossible to evaluate them without comparing them to 
competing positions. 
10. The missing link in the scientism debate  
 Discussions about scientism understood as a synthesis of many philo-
sophical positions dominate the literature devoted to this issue. There is 
also plenty of polemic with particular authors who admit to being scientists 
or are accused of such sympathies. It is rare for commentators to analyze 
alternatives to scientism, and without this, it is impossible to evaluate any 
position fully. The search for antiscientism can be carried out in two ways. 
The first is to extract antiscientism from the writings of scientism's critics. 
The second is to determine its shape based on scientism's presentation, for 
which it is to be an alternative. Every view, theory, or even a single state-
ment can be criticized from a neutral position; therefore, not every criticism 
of scientism will contain an alternative to this view. 
 Furthermore, even if the criticism is not neutral, it does not have to 
directly express an antiscientistic position; a reconstruction of such a posi-
tion will be required. The second approach has a significant advantage be-
cause it allows one to build a theoretical framework for later attempts to 
extract antiscientistic positions from specific texts. Thus, this is the one we 
will start with. 
 The types of scientism cited earlier provide a good starting point for 
constructing possible alternatives to this view. Since scientism is associated 
with scientific imperialism, antiscientistic positions will oppose it. The dis-
agreement with the view that the boundaries of science are much further 
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than we think can be expressed with the help of many different statements 
that form the basis for different types of antiscientism. One may argue that 
the natural sciences have now reached their end and that we will not learn 
anything new thanks to them. In particular, they will never enter the realms 
of law or philosophy. As with scientistic imperialism, there is no reason to 
reject or accept such antiscientistic imperialism. It is impossible to decide 
where and when the development of the natural sciences will stop.  
 Much more radical opposition to scientific imperialism is also possible. 
According to extreme imperialistic antiscientism, the natural sciences have 
either long exceeded their powers or, indeed, have never had them because 
they can be wholly reduced to social sciences (e.g., sociology) or other fields 
of culture (such as philosophy or poetry) and the issues they study are just 
social constructs. Alternatively, no discourse is distinguished, so there is no 
question of crossing boundaries. Supporters of social constructivism, femi-
nist philosophy of science, or methodological anarchism would probably 
agree with such claims (Burr, 2003; Feyerabend, 1993; Harding, 1991). In-
ternal antiscientism has automatically emerged from the above statements, 
one which in its most extreme version will proclaim the reduction of natural 
sciences to a discipline belonging to the social sciences, possibly to philoso-
phy, or even religion or theology. Opponents of internal scientism do not 
have to be so radical — they can settle for a much weaker position and 
proclaim the view that specific disciplines cannot be reduced to natural 
sciences. This impossibility may be absolute or limited to the current state 
of knowledge. 
 To negate the extreme version of epistemic scientism is enough to agree 
that Moorean truths belong to the set of knowledge and deny that its only 
source is the natural sciences. Of course, epistemic antiscientism can take 
an extreme form, not so much pointing to sources of knowledge other than 
scientific ones, but limiting human cognition to only one sphere related to 
intuition, mystical experience, or some form of philosophical insight into 
the essence of things, for example. Thus, epistemic antiscientism would ex-
clude the natural sciences for not being a credible source of knowledge or 
put them below the alternative of its choice. The natural representatives of 
ontological antiscientism are various religions and related metaphysical as-
sumptions, but these are usually an extension of the ontology provided by 
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the natural sciences, so antiscientism based on them will be moderate. Other 
examples of moderate versions of this notion can be provided by various 
philosophical realisms, i.e., positions that postulate mathematical entities' 
autonomous existence, moral norms. The extreme version of ontological an-
tiscientism can be found in such philosophical positions as Platonism, rec-
ognizing the world of ideas as the only actual reality, or in social construc-
tivism — which I mentioned above — on the assumption that it treats the 
entirety of reality, including the world of nature, as a social construct. 
 It is time to look at the actual uses of the term "scientism." Philosophical 
texts on scientism can be divided into two groups, the first of which com-
prises debates on the nature of scientism, in which the authors consider how 
to define this term loosely, how to distinguish its various varieties. The 
second group will contain all polemics, containing critiques and defenses 
written by supporters and opponents of its different varieties. In the latter 
case, antiscientism will assume different variations on the types outlined 
above. In addition to theoretical considerations, there are texts in which 
the word "scientism" functions as an accusation or an epithet used to dis-
credit an opponent's position. Discussions in which such an allegation is 
made usually concern the conflict between science and some other field, 
most often philosophy and religion, and the dispute concerning the legiti-
macy of pursuing the latter. It is not only supporters of philosophy and 
religion who use this term in this way. In 2015, a public forum entitled 
"Scientism in the Age of Obama" was held in the United States, with the 
primary goal of agitating against the various science-based elements of the 
American president's political program at that time (Pigliucci, 2017).  
 Another example is an article defending homeopathy against main-
stream science. According to this article, mainstream science does not allow 
homeopathic therapies to be treated as a science because, being possessed 
by a scientistic ideology, it cannot see the advantages of homeopathic ther-
apies (Ledermann, 2003). Rupert Sheldrake (2012) uses the term in a similar 
way when he writes about the scientific worldview's followers. This term in 
the above cases not only serves as an accusation, but it also forms the basis 
for an appreciation of the defended discipline, or at least elevating it to the 
scientific level, thereby dismissing any criticism as unfounded. 
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 Assuming that scientism and antiscientism are opposite positions in the 
dispute over the nature of the natural sciences' relationship and some other 
field or aspect of reality, their final shape will depend on how this relation-
ship is seen. Using any of these terms on its own does not make sense be-
cause a given statement may be considered scientistic by one opponent and 
antiscientistic by another. One may be convinced that physics will someday 
displace all metaphysical inquiries like it has displaced Aristotelian physics 
while claiming that ethics will remain out of its reach. Such a person in a 
dispute with a supporter of extreme scientism, who claims that physics will 
also absorb ethics, will take an antiscientistic position. However, to a pro-
ponent of the thesis that metaphysics will never succumb to studying the 
natural sciences, they will appear to be taking a scientistic position. That 
is why it is so important to define this relationship discussed by scien-
tism/antiscientism; it is only by defining it that we will identify a proposed 
position as supporting or opposing. 
11. Scientophilia and scientism 
 Scientophilia, at first glance, resembles a peculiar version of scientism, 
probably an epistemic one, as it is challenging to identify the single point 
where a proponent of such a view would disagree with a scientophile. How-
ever, if we take a closer look at both concepts, there should be a few crucial 
differences, although the level of dissimilarity between these two depends 
on the chosen variation of scientism itself. 
 The first important distinction between scientophilia and epistemic sci-
entism concerns that scientophilia is not limited to scientific methods or 
even scientific (in a narrow sense) knowledge. Scientophilia is interested in 
specific knowledge-forming procedures, and science appears to be an excel-
lent example of its implementation. A scientophile accepts the reliability of 
any discipline practiced by a community of experts who evaluate each other, 
who have developed intersubjective methods of evaluating evidence, indulge 
in critical discussions, and submit their works to journals with peer-review 
procedures. Thus, science is in the highest place; nevertheless, other levels 
of expertise are acceptable when scientific expertise is redundant or not 
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attainable. From a scientophilia perspective, disputes over "whether disci-
pline X is scientific or not" are superfluous as long as X's purported experts 
can reach an evidence-based consensus. However, if a consensus has not 
been attained, there is no reason to adopt either side's position; it makes 
no difference if this discipline is physics, philosophy, history of jazz, or reli-
gion. Scientophilia also places Moorean truths among consensus-based 
knowledge, and as far as these are concerned, each of us is sufficiently com-
petent to represent, in specific circumstances, a credible and reliable level 
of expertise. Therefore in such cases as whether a given person has hand, 
or how to hold woodcutter’s axe there is a consensus among peers. None-
theless, if any particular epistemic version of scientism can adopt Moorean 
truths and other non-scientific types of knowledge (law, for example) as a 
reliable source in cases where scientific expertise is not attainable, this dis-
tinction will begin to fade away; otherwise, scientophilia will appear closer 
to epistemic antiscientism. 
 The second difference is inextricably linked to the essential characteris-
tic of scientophilia, where epistemic scientism is a proper philosophical po-
sition, scientophilia is instead a decision-making strategy. Scientophilia aims 
at making our decisions about opinions and testimonies more efficient; thus, 
its sole advice is to trust any purported expert, only if their opinion is 
consistent with their peers, eventually to accord a given opinion no greater 
degree of belief than that found in the expert community. While the pri-
mary goal of scientophilia is practical, there is no doubt that scientophilia 
rests on a theoretical foundation, which includes statements shared with 
epistemic scientism, especially those that place natural sciences on the po-
dium. Scientism is not scientophilia's only ingredient; for example, there is 
an aspect of scientophilia that attaches great weight to the significance of 
consensus, and this feature is based preferably on common sense than on 
scientism itself. That is because common sense, not scientism, implies trust 
in the coherent testimony of a group of eyewitnesses when we have not been 
able to experience the event they saw. Scientophilia adjusts this suggestion 
to scientific considerations; one should trust in the coherent testimony of a 
group of credible and reliable experts, whenever he has not been able (usu-
ally due to lacking sufficient competence), to gather and evaluate evidence 
accumulated by those experts. 
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 In terms of other scientism variations, scientophilia is usually theoreti-
cally indifferent; however, there are possible areas in which conflict may 
arise. If scientific imperialism is considered, there is no common ground 
between the robust version of this position and scientophilia, as the latter 
is relatively silent about science boundaries. When scientific imperialism 
states that science can solve any problem, scientophilia only advises adopt-
ing the position of the most reliable expert if such opinion is available on 
the issue. Such an approach is nothing more than informed trust based not 
on substantive but formal cues, such as credibility and compliance with 
other professionals' opinions. Scientophilia does not determine what issues 
a scientific consensus is possible on whatnot, but advises recognizing it if it 
has already been established. However, there is a possible conflict. Since 
scientophilia allows the existence of unscientific knowledge and even en-
dorses experts who are not scientists themselves, it can be reconciled with 
the notion that there are problems that science has not solved, but that 
they at least have provisional, though unscientific solutions. As a result, the 
proponent of scientific imperialism will have a hard time accepting sciento-
philia as a whole. With weaker versions of scientific imperialism, namely 
those which express belief in scientific progress, scientophilia can coexist 
without the slightest problem. 
 Scientophilia and internal scientism are entirely indifferent to each 
other, there are no points that would cause any conflict between them, but 
there are no joint statements for them either. There is no contradiction in 
the fact that the most radical advocate of the "scientization" of all possible 
disciplines outside the natural sciences domain simultaneously applies the 
guidelines provided by scientophiles, at least to the very moment when sci-
entization becomes complete. As for ontological scientism, scientophilia 
takes no position regarding the existence of anything unless it is about ex-
perts and the opinions they express; their existence is, of course, presup-
posed. With the guidance provided by scientophilia, it is impossible to es-
tablish whether something exists or not, but whether we should trust the 
people who postulate the existence of objects belonging to a given category. 
It follows that scientophilia is potentially open to various ontological posi-
tions, even those which contradict ontological scientism. That is the theo-
retical level; in practice, scientophilia can be challenging to distinguish from 
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ontological scientism as their verdicts will coincide. After all, consensus on 
matters such as the number of existing gods or the existence of an afterlife 
is lacking, but there is consensus on objects such as planets, atoms, or genes. 
The relation of scientophilia to imperialist antiscientism resembles the rela-
tionship between scientophilia and imperialist scientism. If a given altera-
tion of imperialist anitscientism is a moderate one, it allows and endorses 
equal every existing narration or possible discourse; then it follows that a 
scientophilia-based approach is also allowed endorsed. Therefore, at least 
theoretically, it is possible to embrace the guidelines of scientophilia and 
simultaneously be a moderate imperialist antiscientist partisan. However, 
among antiscientistic imperialists, some positions seek to distinguish some 
discourse, for example, the philosophical or the religious, as a more reliable 
source than a scientific position. Neither of these stances, by nature, will be 
compatible with the guidelines provided by scientophilia because sooner or 
later, the latter will recommend adopting an opinion that turns out to be 
contrary to that of the distinguished discourse. The relation to antiscien-
tisitc internalism is correspondingly dual; that is, scientophilia is consistent 
with any moderate version. However, any supporter of a more radical ver-
sion of this philosophical position will find deference to the best expertise 
hard to accept. If agreeing that Moorean truth belongs to the set of 
knowledge is enough for a given concept to be classified as epistemic anti-
scientism, then scientophilia should be categorized as such. Of course, in a 
more radical form of epistemic scientism, the partnership between these two 
will be limited or even impossible. The ontology assumed by a scientophile 
is indeed liberal. However, when it comes to various ontologies postulated 
by ontological antiscientisms, their credibility will depend on whether a 
consensus of reliable experts supports them, and in most cases, they are 
not. Among philosophers, there are convinced platonists, but there is not 
even the slightest agreement between peer professionals about the possible 
contents, capacity, and other qualities of the world of ideas, not to mention 
lack of agreement on whether such a plane exists in the first place. 
 If we agree that mild or moderate scientism embraces the following 
maxim "When any belief and science clash, 'tis belief must go to smash", 
then scientophilia occurs as a peculiar variant of mild scientism. However, 
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its central thesis is not about sources of knowledge or the existence of var-
ious objects but rather sets out a strategy to support the decision-making 
process. It should be noted that scientophilia does not claim that the natural 
sciences are the only source of knowledge; apart from physics and chemistry, 
it respects the achievements of other sciences, including psychology, sociol-
ogy, economics, history; it is even able to treat a personal opinion or testi-
mony as a reliable source. Therefore, scientophilia can also be adapted by 
both moderate scientists and mild antiscientists. Its belonging to one or the 
other concept depends mainly on the nuances contained in the definition of 
a given stance. Things get even more complicated when we distinguish local 
alterations of scientophilia, which, contrary to its global counterpart, is lim-
ited to a selected group of problems. Consider a declared phenomenologist, 
who believes that his philosophical method is the most reliable approach, 
but unfortunately, its cognitive scope is excessively limited to ethical values. 
Whenever she ponders any issue outside of the field of ethics, she can behave 
like an exemplary scientophile and defer to the most reliable expertise. 
12. Problems and limitations 
 Scientophilia is not without flaws, and one of its most essential imper-
fections is a problem with, for lack of a better term, self-proclaimed experts 
such as clairvoyants, psychics, or various pseudoscientists. Communities 
that bring such individuals together, with an appropriate degree of organi-
zation, can create convincing imitations of evidence-based consensuses. 
There are even peer-review journals dedicated to homeopathy, for example, 
so detection of such well-crafted deceit requires the enrichment of the sci-
entophilia-based approach with more advanced critical thinking tools. 
 Another problematic issue is linked to the probabilistic character of sci-
entophilia, as this heuristic does not guarantee by any means that the pro-
vided inferences are indefeasible. What seems today to be an established 
consensus may tomorrow turn out to be a rejected theory. Inference to the 
best expertise is never definitive, as it aims at providing the most success 
in the long run, not in a particular case. Hence, false negatives are inevita-
ble. If a consistent scientophile had met Albert Einstein before the entire 
world of physicists had acknowledged him, it would have been reasonable 
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for him to dismiss his theory. The basis of such a decision is that Einstein’s 
theory was more likely to be inconsistent with classical mechanics because 
he was a dilettante than it was that he was a lonesome and unrecognized 
genius presenting a groundbreaking thesis. In this striking example, scien-
tophilia’s advice leads to a catastrophic mistake, but it will discard as un-
reliable an unimaginable number of amateurs at the expense of that single 
genius when applied dozens of times. 
 An additional issue is associated with the fact that consensus may be 
elusive and challenging to identify for a person lacking a good experience 
and understanding of scientific communication. Such compelling indicators 
of established consensus as textbooks, reports of prominent scientific organ-
izations akin to the IPCC, WHO, or FDA. are not always obtainable for 
various reasons, but mostly because there are none. That means consensus 
is probably, at least at the moment, part of esoteric knowledge and is rec-
ognized only among specialists dedicated to a particular domain within 
which consensus has been established. Other explanations are possible, too; 
for example, a consensus has not been fully formed yet. Regardless of the 
causes, the only solution is to seek the advice of a credible expert. Unfortu-
nately, we do not always meet the latter personally; therefore, our oppor-
tunities to ask them consensus questions are minimal. 
 Occasionally scientophilia will leave its followers with a recommendation 
to suspend judgment. It is inconvenient because many disputes have a prac-
tical dimension, which means taking one side involves taking a particular 
action. In this case, Suspending judgment is practically equivalent to adopt-
ing a position because we will act following one side or, following the other, 
we will do nothing. For example, if there is a dispute on whether vaccines 
cause autism and there is a position of evidence-based medicine,  opposed 
by a person who states that she had a revelation, in which the angel an-
nounced that vaccines cause autism. Even if we decide to suspend judgment, 
we will take some action, i.e., to vaccinate or not, which is equivalent to 
adopting one of the positions. 
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13. Conclusion 
 Scientophilia is hardly an alternative for various alterations of both sci-
entism and antiscientism in terms of being a philosophical position. How-
ever, scientophilia is not without philosophical assumptions, and those can 
be treated as potential substitutes. We can say that scientophilia supports 
science because it is an unprecedented phenomenon in our culture. Undeni-
ably, science has many drawbacks: scientists lie, deceive, make mistakes, or 
even give in to fashions. However, it is precisely the same as the case of 
philosophers, priests, historians, homeopaths, law professors. The difference 
is that scientists sometimes manage to expose these lies, deceptions, mis-
takes, and fashions, thus choosing the best-justified claims. Therefore, cer-
tain things are established in science, which is not always the case within 
nonscientific disciplines, as there are domains as philosophy, for example, 
which lack consensus. It does not mean that the latter is devoid of any value 
or that some form of science should replace it. 
 On the contrary, philosophy is necessary for ethical or political issues 
because even with science, we have not worked out anything better than 
what is offered by the multitude of philosophical positions. If there is no 
established consensus among scientists on such issues as ethical values, the 
definition of justice, number of existing gods, sense of life, then from the 
perspective of scientophilia, there is no difference between a scientist opin-
ion, a philosopher’s, or a priest’s point of view, as neither of their positions 
is backed up by a significant majority of other purported experts. However, 
let us say if philosophers could reach a consensus on any of the above mat-
ters, and that consensus resulted from a critical debate on the gathered 
evidence, followers of scientophilia should adopt such a position like any 
other consensus reached by experts. Scientophilia is a love for science be-
cause the scientific consensus is much more common than in other areas 
and is also easier to recognize. 
 On the other hand, if we consider scientism or antiscientism as strategies 
guiding changes of beliefs, of course, insofar as they contain such guidelines, 
at least as tacit assumptions. Scientophilia may appear to be a compelling 
rival for the stronger versions of both positions, mostly when we speak of 
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scientism and anti-scientism, which are simultaneously epistemic, ontologi-
cal, and imperialist. Such radical varieties of these two can lead to undesir-
able and even harmful consequences, such as the exclusion of various naive 
or amateur historical and anthropological theories from the area of pseudo-
sciences, or rejection of reliability of various nonscientific specializations 
(law, for example) on the basis that they are not scientific (in a narrow 
sense) fields on the one hand, or the legitimation of religious fundamental-
ism, numerous forms of relativism, the admission of pseudoscience or even 
various conspiracy theories on the other. It seems that the view of reliable 
sources of knowledge adopted in imperialist scientism is too narrow and too 
wide in the case of its antiscientisitic counterpart. Scientophilia avoids these 
risks. In the mild versions of both scientism and antiscientism, scientophilia 
can be adopted as an addendum to them, especially when the cues provided 
by both of these stances are confusing or indecisive. 
 The idea of putting scientophilia in the scientistic camp rather than 
among antiscientistic positions may seem reasonable and tempting, espe-
cially since in disputes between philosophy, religion, and science, it will 
usually advocate taking the latter’s side, as quintessential scientism. How-
ever, its consensus-based approach makes this problematic because, on nu-
merous occasions, a science position will not be needed, and there is an 
acceptable possibility that, in some cases, it will be not preferred. In this 
situation, scientophilia seems to be closer to being the third way. 
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